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    OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 This case comes before us on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court.  Ziya Koray, who was sentenced to federal 
prison camp after pleading guilty to commission of the offense of 
laundering monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 
(a)(1), filed a request with the Bureau of Prisons to credit 
toward his 41-month prison sentence approximately 150 days he 
spent pursuant to court order in a community treatment center 
pending sentencing.  Koray argued that he was entitled to such 
credit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides that a 
defendant "be given credit toward the service of a term of 
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention 
prior to the date the sentence commences."  The Bureau of Prisons 
denied Koray's request because it interprets that statute as 
limited to credit for time spent in the custody of the Attorney 
General in a corrections facility by a defendant who has been 
denied bail. 
 Koray filed a habeas corpus petition in the district 
court, which denied Koray's petition.  On appeal, this court held 
that the reference to "official detention" in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 
included "time spent under conditions of jail-type confinement," 
and reversed and remanded to the district court to ascertain 
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whether the conditions under which Koray had been confined in the 
treatment center met that standard.  Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 
567 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 115 S. Ct. 787 
(1995), and reversed.  Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995). The 
Court adopted the statutory interpretation proffered by the 
Bureau of Prisons.  It held that "official detention" of 18 
U.S.C. § 3585(b) was coextensive with confinement imposed 
pursuant to a court order detaining a defendant and committing 
him to the custody of the Attorney General -- and accordingly was 
exclusive of other instances of pre-sentence confinement, 
regardless of their character or extent.  The Court relied, in 
large part, on the scope and meaning of related provisions of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA).  Under that statute, a court has 
an option either to "release" a defendant on bail, albeit subject 
to various restrictive conditions, or to "detain" the defendant 
without bail by issuing a detention order "direct[ing] that the 
person be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for 
confinement in a corrections facility."  18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2). 
The Court reasoned that the phrase "official detention" in 18 
U.S.C. § 3585(b), therefore, involves such commitment and custody 
as necessary elements.  115 S. Ct. at 2025.  The Court noted that 
reference to "the official detention facility" in 18 U.S.C. 
§3585(a) necessarily paralleled reference to "commit[ment] to the 
custody of the Bureau of Prisons" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a), since 
both clauses made provision for the proper administration of 
sentenced defendants.  Id. at 2025-26.  References to "official 
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detention" in other statutory provisions, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§3622(b) & (c), also supported the Government's position that the 
phrase "official detention" in 18 U.S.C § 3585(b) was limited to 
confinement in a correctional facility designated by the Bureau 
of Prisons for the service of federal sentences.  Id. at 2026. 
  The Court also referred to a number of additional 
reasons for its conclusion, noting the uniform refusal of the 
Courts of Appeals to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3568, the predecessor 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), as authorizing sentence credit for pre-
sentence restrictions on defendants' liberty imposed as 
conditions of release, and the practical difficulties attending 
the fact-intensive inquiry into each defendant's circumstances of 
confinement that this court's approach would have entailed.  Id. 
at 2026, 2028-29. 
 The Supreme Court remanded this matter to us for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.  We conclude 
that the only proceeding that is appropriate is for us to remand 
this matter to the district court to reenter the order denying 
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 
